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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Your client just spent the day on the witness stand at trial, giving her side of the 
facts that support her claim.  You did not ask her about her conversations with you 
or any of her other attorneys, and they never came up.  But, just to be safe, you 
prefaced several of your more general questions with the limitation that she was to 
answer without revealing any discussions with you or her other attorneys.   
The next day, your adversary calls you to the stand as a witness.  In the heated 
exchange that follows, she explains to the judge that, under Ohio law, your client’s 
voluntary testimony waived the attorney-client privilege.  Specifically, she points to 
Ohio Revised Code § 2317.02(A)(1), which provides that, “if the client voluntarily 
testifies . . . , the attorney may be compelled to testify on the same subject.”1  
Outraged, you respond that your client’s testimony went nowhere near the substance 
of attorney-client privileged communications, so there cannot possibly be a waiver.  
As to the statute, you explain that its reference to the “same subject” limits its 
application to instances where, unlike here, the client reveals the substance of 
                                                          
*
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1
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(A)(1) (West 2011).   
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attorney-client communications, which waives the privilege and, thus, allows 
examination of the attorney “on the same subject.”  Who wins this argument?  The 
short answer: It may not be you.   
As detailed in Part II below, the sentence in Ohio Revised Code § 2317.02(A) on 
which your adversary focused can be traced to a provision in Ohio’s first code of 
civil procedure, which was enacted in 1853.2  That code of civil procedure 
eliminated the common law “interested witness rule,” which provided that interested 
witnesses―anyone with an interest in the litigation including parties―were 
incompetent to testify based on concerns about the risk of perjury.3  However, it 
exacted a heavy price for this new ability of parties to testify.  Specifically, voluntary 
testimony was “to be deemed a consent to the examination” of the witness’s 
“attorney . . . on the same subject.”4  Presumably, this was intended to address the 
common law’s concerns about perjury by interested witnesses.  Part II also describes 
subsequent modifications to this provision up through its incorporation into the 
current Ohio attorney-client privilege statute, Ohio Revised Code § 2317.02(A), as 
well as the manner in which courts interpreted this language through the first half of 
the twentieth century. 
Part III of this Article describes more recent decisions addressing claims that, 
based on Ohio Revised Code § 2317.02(A), voluntary testimony waives the 
attorney-client privilege.  It concludes that, while it rarely occurs, there is a risk that 
a court will find that the statutory attorney-client privilege waiver provision, enacted 
in 1853 to address concerns underlying the common law’s now-long-forgotten 
“interested witness rule,” remains in effect.    
Part IV examines the extent to which a rule that waiver occurs in such 
circumstances can be reconciled with the policies underlying the attorney-client 
privilege and criminal defendants’ right to testify in their own defense.  It concludes 
that a rule that voluntary testimony results in a broad waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege cannot be reconciled with modern justifications for the attorney-client 
privilege.  Finally, Part V outlines proposals to conform Ohio law to modern 
concepts of privilege waiver.   
II.  THE WAIVER THROUGH VOLUNTARY TESTIMONY STATUTE: ITS ORIGIN, 
EVOLUTION, AND APPLICATION BEFORE 1960 
Ohio statutorily adopted English common law both when Ohio was a territory 
and again after becoming a state on March 1, 1803.5  English common law courts 
regularly recognized the attorney-client privilege in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.6  We have not located reported Ohio decisions directly 
                                                          
 
2
 See infra Part II.A. 
 
3
 See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
 
4
 See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 
5
 1 THE STATUTES OF OHIO AND OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY, ADOPTED OR ENACTED 
FROM 1788 TO 1833 INCLUSIVE 190 (Salmon P. Chase ed., 1833) [hereinafter CHASE] (statute 
passed on July 14, 1795; adopting common law for the Ohio territory); id. at 512 (statute 
passed on February 14, 1805; adopting common law for the State of Ohio and, in § 2, 
repealing analogous 1795 territorial law).  
 
6
 See generally 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2290-91 
(John T. McNaughton rev., Little, Brown & Co. 1961) (discussing the history of the attorney-
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addressing the attorney-client privilege before 1850.  Nevertheless, other American 
courts, on which Ohio courts frequently relied during this era,7 regularly recognized 
the attorney-client privilege in the first half of the nineteenth century.8   
Reported decisions from that time, however, do not reflect consideration of the 
effect of voluntary testimony as a potential waiver of the attorney-client privilege.  
This dearth of authority is likely the result of the fact that the interested witness rule 
barred privilege-holders from testifying at all in most circumstances where the issue 
of waiver through voluntary testimony might have arisen.9  Specifically, at common 
law in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, witnesses with a pecuniary 
interest in the action, including parties, were incompetent to testify based on a 
presumed need to avoid opportunities for perjured testimony, and criminal 
defendants, while permitted to testify, could not testify under oath.10   
The “interested witness rule” came under attack in England in the first half of the 
nineteenth century from Jeremy Bentham, among others.11  He argued that the rule’s 
presumed benefit―excluding perjured testimony―carried with it too great a cost in 
terms of excluding relevant evidence, particularly when cross-examination and the 
jury’s awareness of the interest reduced the potential that fact-finding would be 
based on perjured testimony.12  The reformers ultimately prevailed. The rule 
disqualifying interested witnesses was abolished in England for (1) non-party 
witnesses in civil and criminal actions by Lord Denman’s Act in 1843; (2) civil 
parties by Lord Brougham’s Act in 1851; and (3) criminal defendants by the 
Criminal Evidence Act of 1898.13   
Before 1850, Ohio courts regularly excluded interested witnesses as incompetent 
to testify, following the English common law rule.14  On March 23, 1850, the Ohio 
                                                          
client privilege and explaining that the privilege dates back to the reign of Queen Elizabeth); 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1061, 1069-87 (1978) (tracing the development of the privilege in English common 
law from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries). 
 
7
 See, e.g., Lessee of Glover’s Heirs v. Ruffin, 6 Ohio 255 (1834) (citing and relying on 
decisions from other jurisdictions); McGregor & Co. v. Kilgore, 6 Ohio 358 (1834) (same); 
Morris v. Edwards, 1 Ohio 189 (1823) (same); Kerr v. Mack, 1 Ohio 161 (1823) (same). 
 
8
 See, e.g., Jenkinson v. Indiana, 5 Blackf. 465 (Ind. 1840); Aiken v. Kilburne, 27 Me. 
252 (1847); Hatton v. Robinson, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 416 (1833); Crisler v. Garland, 19 Miss. 
(11 S. & M.) 136 (1848); March v. Ludlum, 3 Sand. Ch. 35 (N.Y. Ch. 1845); Moore v. Bray, 
10 Pa. 519 (1849).    
 
9
 See generally 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 575-87 
(James H. Chadbourne rev., Little, Brown & Co. 1979) (describing history of interested 
witness rule); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-87 (1961) (describing history of 
interested witness rule in criminal actions). 
 
10
 Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 573-87. 
 
11
 7 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL 
EVIDENCE PART 2) (1843). 
 
12
  Id. at 919-21.  
 
13
 Joel N. Bodansky, The Abolition of the Party-Witness Disqualification: An Historical 
Survey, 70 KY. L.J. 91, 93 (1981-82).   
 
14
 See, e.g., Dille v. Woods, 14 Ohio 122 (1846) (reversing where interested witness’s 
testimony was admitted); Armstrong v. Deshler, 12 Ohio 475 (1843) (affirming exclusion of 
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General Assembly passed a statute that was based on Lord Denman’s Act and 
removed the competency limitation on interested third-party witnesses, as well as on 
parties called on cross-examination in courts of law, but it retained the rule that 
parties seeking to testify voluntarily were incompetent.15  On March 18, 1851, the 
General Assembly extended this rule to chancery actions.16 
A.  The 1853 Ohio Code of Civil Procedure 
On March 11, 1853, the Ohio General Assembly enacted the Code of Civil 
Procedure (“1853 Ohio CCP”),17 which included over six hundred sections.  Days 
later, the General Assembly enacted two additional lengthy codes, a probate code 
and one governing practice before justices of the peace.18  Not surprisingly given this 
volume of legislative activity in such a short period, the 1853 Ohio CCP was not 
developed from scratch in Ohio and was not even the work of Ohio’s General 
Assembly.  Instead, the 1853 Ohio CCP was prepared by three commissioners: 
William Kennon, William S. Groesbeck, and Daniel O. Morton (collectively “Ohio 
                                                          
interested witness’s testimony); Marshall ex rel Kearny v. Thrailkill’s Ex’r, 12 Ohio 275 
(1843) (reversing judgment based on interested witness’s testimony).   
 
15
 2 THE PUBLIC STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE STATE OF OHIO: FROM THE CLOSE OF CHASE’S 
STATUTES, FEBRUARY, 1833, TO THE PRESENT TIME 1522 (Maskell E. Curwen ed., 1853) 
[hereinafter CURWEN] (statute passed on March 23, 1850, adopting Lord Denman’s rule in 
actions at law), repealed Ch. 1202, § 606 (Mar. 11, 1853).  Chapter 975 provided: 
  Sec. 1.  Be it enacted, etc., That a party to any action at law, in any of the courts of 
this State, may be examined as a witness by the adverse party, or by either one of 
several adverse parties; and for that purpose may be compelled to attend at the trial, if 
residing within the county where such suit is pending, or to give a deposition if 
without such county, in the same manner, and subject to the same rules of 
examination, as other witnesses are compelled to testify. 
 
  Sec. 2.  A person for whose immediate benefit any such action may be prosecuted 
or defended, may be examined as a witness in the same manner, and subject to the 
same rules of examination as provided in the preceding section. 
 
  Sec. 3.  No person offered as a witness shall be excluded by reason of his or her 
interest in the event of the action; but this section shall not apply to a party in the 
action, nor to any party for whose immediate benefit such action is prosecuted or 
defended, nor to any assignee of a thing in action, assigned for the purpose of making 
him a witness. 
 
  Sec. 4.  This act shall take effect from and after the first day of July next [July 1, 
1850]. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  Footnote one of Chapter 975 as reprinted in Curwen’s PUBLIC 
STATUTES AT LARGE, which does not appear in the session laws, stated that “[t]his act is 
substantially copied from Lord Denman’s Act, which with the English decisions upon it, will 
be found in 9 Western Law Journal, 326.”  Id. 
 
16
 2 CURWEN, supra note 15, at 1597.   
 
17
 3 CURWEN, supra note 15, at 1938. 
 
18
 Id. at 2041, 2052.   
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Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings”).19  They were appointed pursuant to 
Ohio’s 1851 Constitution, which called for appointed commissioners to “revise the 
practice, pleadings, forms and proceedings of the courts of record” in Ohio.20   
The Ohio Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings’ January 1853 report to the 
General Assembly acknowledged that they were “chiefly indebted to the 
extraordinary labors of the New York commissioners upon practice and pleadings,” 
but also were “assisted by those of Kentucky, Missouri, Indiana, Massachusetts, and 
other States, where the example of New York has been in a great degree followed.”21  
In the respects that are pertinent here, the 1853 Ohio CCP was adapted from the 
proposed (but never enacted) December 1850 Final Report of the New York State 
Commissioners on Pleadings and Practice, often referred to as the “Field 
Commission” after Commissioner David Dudley Field (“Field Commission” or 
“1850 Field Code”).22   
The three provisions of the 1853 Ohio CCP most relevant here―sections 310, 
314(4), and 315―are closely analogous to provisions in the 1850 Field Code.  First, 
§ 310 of the 1853 Ohio CCP abolished the interested witness rule for parties to most 
civil actions,23 providing that: 
No person shall be disqualified as a witness, in any civil action or 
proceeding, at law, by reason of his interest in the event of the same, as a 
party or otherwise, or by reason of his conviction of a crime; but such 
                                                          
 
19
 William Kennon was a member of the United States House of Representatives (1829-
33; 1835-37), a common pleas judge (1840-47), a delegate to the convention that drafted 
Ohio’s 1851 Constitution, and sat on the Supreme Court of Ohio (1854-56).  Lawrence 
Kestenbaum, Index to Politicians, THE POLITICAL GRAVEYARD, http://politicalgraveyard.com/ 
bio/kennedy-kensey.html#R9M0J2SF8 (last visited May 5, 2011).  William S. Groesbeck was 
a delegate to the convention that drafted Ohio’s 1851 Constitution, a member of the United 
States House of Representatives (1857-59), and a member of the Ohio Senate (1862-64).  Id., 
http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/gritzmacher-grosfeld.html#R9M0IYTRC (last visited May 
5, 2011).  Daniel O. Morton was the Mayor of Toledo, Ohio (1849-50) and later the United 
States District Attorney for Ohio (1853-57). Id., http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/morton.html 
(last visited May 5, 2011). 
 
20
 OHIO CONST. art. XIV, § 2 (repealed 1953).     
 
21
 OHIO COMMISSIONERS ON PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON 
PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS: CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE iv (Columbus, Osgood & Blake 1853) 
[hereinafter 1853 OHIO COMMISSIONERS’ REPORT]. 
 
22
 COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK (Weed, Parson & Co. 1850) [hereinafter 1850 PROPOSED FIELD CODE].  
New York adopted a code of civil procedure based on the New York Commissioners on 
Practice and Pleadings’ 1848 report and amended its code based on the 1849 revision of that 
report, but it never adopted the 1850 Proposed Field Code, which was issued in December 
1850.  Mildred V. Coe & Lewis W. Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David 
Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238 (1942). 
 
23
 Parties still were incompetent “where the adverse party is the executor, or administrator, 
of a deceased person, when the facts to be proved, transpired before the death of such 
deceased person.”  3 CURWEN, supra note 15, at 1986. 
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interest or conviction may be shown for the purpose of affecting his 
credibility.24   
The wording of § 310 closely tracked the wording of an 1849 Connecticut statute 
and, in substance, had the same effect as § 1708 of the 1850 Field Code.25  
Furthermore, reflecting the significance of the “interested witness rule” in that era, 
the reports of both the Ohio Commissioners on Pleadings and Practice and the Field 
Commission included lengthy comments with these sections explaining that the risk 
of perjury created by admitting testimony from interested witnesses was (1) offset by 
the jury’s ability to consider the interests involved, as well as the adverse party’s 
ability to explore the testimony on cross-examination, and (2) outweighed by the 
benefits of admitting such highly-relevant testimony.26   
Second, § 314(4) of the 1853 Ohio CCP rendered attorneys “incompetent to 
testify . . . concerning any communication made to him by his client in that relation, 
or his advice thereon, without the client’s consent.”27  Although set forth in terms of 
the attorney’s incompetence to testify and not as a privilege for confidential 
attorney-client communications, this is the initial Ohio legislative enactment 
                                                          
 
24
 Id.  
 
25
 REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 86 (Case, Tiffany, and Co. 1849) 
provided that:  
No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any suit or proceeding at law, or in 
equity, by reason of his interest in the event of the same, as a party or otherwise; or by 
reason of his conviction of a crime; but such interest or conviction may be shown for 
the purpose of affecting his credit. 
Section 1708 of the 1850 Field Code abolished the interested witness rule for parties.  1850 
PROPOSED FIELD CODE, supra note 22, § 1708 (“All persons, without exception, otherwise 
than as specified in the next two sections [relating to those of unsound mind, children under 
10 years of age, and certain confidential communications], who, having organs of sense, can 
perceive, and perceiving can make known their perceptions to others, may be witnesses.  
Therefore neither parties, nor other persons who have an interest in the event of an action or 
proceeding, are excluded, nor those who have been convicted of crime, nor persons on 
account of their opinions on matters of religious belief: although in every case, the credibility 
of the witness may be drawn in question . . . .”). 
 
26
 1853 OHIO COMMISSIONERS’ REPORT, supra note 21, at 128-41; 1850 PROPOSED FIELD 
CODE, supra note 22, at 715-25. 
 
27
 Section 314 of the 1853 OHIO CCP provided: 
The following persons shall be incompetent to testify: (1) Persons who are of unsound 
mind at the time of their production for examination.  (2) Children under ten years of 
age who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts respecting which 
they are examined, or of relating them truly.  (3) Husband and wife, for or against 
each other, or concerning any communication made by one to the other during the 
marriage, whether called as a witness while that relation subsisted or afterwards.  (4) 
An attorney, concerning any communication made to him by his client in that relation, 
or his advice thereon, without the client’s consent.  (5) A clergyman or priest, 
concerning any confession made to him in his professional character, in the course of 
discipline, enjoined by the church to which he belongs, without the consent of the 
person making the confession. 
3 CURWEN, supra note 15, at 1986-87. 
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recognizing something resembling the common law attorney-client privilege.  The 
1850 Field Code had a similar provision, § 1710, which provided:  
There are, particular relations, in which it is the policy of the law to 
encourage confidence, and to preserve it inviolate, therefore, a person 
cannot be examined, as a witness, in the following cases: . . . An attorney 
cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined, as to any 
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon, in 
the course of professional employment.28   
Third, § 315 of the 1853 Ohio CCP provided that the client can waive § 314(4)’s 
prohibition against attorneys testifying as to attorney-client communications.29  
Under § 315, “[i]f a person offer[s] himself as a witness, that is to be deemed a 
consent to the examination also of an attorney . . . on the same subject, within the 
meaning of” § 314(4).30  Section 315, which had no explanatory comment from the 
Ohio Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings, was nearly identical to § 1711 of the 
1850 Field Code, which provided: “If a person offer himself as a witness, that is to 
be deemed a consent to the examination also, of a[n] . . . attorney . . . on the same 
subject, within the meaning of the [second] subdivision[] of the last section.”31  And, 
just as the Ohio Commissioners on Pleadings and Practice included no explanatory 
comment with § 315 of the Ohio CCP, the Field Commission had none explaining 
§ 1711 of the Field Code. 
Thus, the 1853 Ohio CCP did three things: (1) for the first time, it made parties 
competent to voluntarily testify in most civil actions; (2) it rendered attorneys 
incompetent to testify as to communications from, and advice provided to, their 
clients; and (3) it provided that a person’s voluntary testimony was “deemed a 
consent to the examination also of an attorney . . . on the same subject.”32  Section 
315 of the 1853 Ohio CCP did not define the scope of the “same subject” as to 
which the attorney could be examined.  However, the implied consent to the 
attorney’s examination in § 315 was triggered by the mere fact that the privilege-
holder “offer[ed] himself as a witness,” as opposed to the privilege-holder providing 
testimony as to the substance of communications with the attorney.33   
Given that the waiver-triggering event was voluntarily testifying, rather than 
testifying about the substance of attorney-client communications, a normal reading 
of the scope of the consented-to examination of the attorney on the “same subject” 
might be that it extended to all matters as to which the voluntarily-testifying 
                                                          
 
28
 1850 PROPOSED FIELD CODE, supra note 22, § 1710. 
 
29
 Section 315 of the 1853 OHIO CCP provided: 
If a person offers himself as a witness, that is to be deemed a consent to the 
examination also of an attorney, clergyman, or priest, on the same subject, within the 
meaning of the last two subdivisions of the preceding section. 
3 CURWEN, supra note 15, at 1987. 
 
30
 Id.  
 
31
 1850 PROPOSED FIELD CODE, supra note 22, § 1711. 
 
32
 See 1853 OHIO COMMISSIONERS’ REPORT, supra note 21, at 142. 
 
33
 Id.  
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privilege holder testified, rather than being limited to any attorney-client 
communications about which the person may have voluntarily testified.  Moreover, 
interpreting the implied privilege waiver broadly in this manner would, at least in a 
general sense, tend to reduce the risk of perjured testimony that, in connection with 
their respective statutory proposals allowing parties to voluntarily testify, so troubled 
the Ohio and New York commissioners.  
B.  King v. Barrett (1860) 
The Supreme Court of Ohio first interpreted §§ 314(4) and 315 of the 1853 Ohio 
CCP in the context of voluntary client testimony in 1860 in King v. Barrett.34  There, 
the plaintiff promissory note holder sued three defendant makers of the notes.35  The 
plaintiff testified voluntarily, and one of the defendants sought to examine the 
plaintiff’s attorney concerning related attorney-client communications on the theory 
that, under § 315, the plaintiff’s voluntary testimony was a “consent” to examining 
the attorney.36  The trial court sustained an objection, prohibiting the questioning.37   
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and began its analysis by noting that the 
1853 Ohio CCP had “materially changed the rule of the common law, as to the 
competency of witnesses” by eliminating the interested witness rule in § 310.38  
After quoting §§ 314 and 315, the court found that, because the plaintiff had testified 
voluntarily that 
he waived all the protection which the law would otherwise have afforded 
to communications made by him to his attorney, pertinent to the issue on 
trial.  Those communications were no longer privileged, and having made 
himself a witness, and given evidence generally in the case, he was 
bound, upon proper inquiry, to tell the whole truth, and his testimony 
became liable to the application of all the usual tests of truth, and to 
impeachment, like that of any other witness, and for this purpose his 
attorney might be called to prove statements and admissions which his 
client, as a witness, denied.  Indeed, we are satisfied that his attorney 
might then be called to prove such admissions, as evidence in chief.39 
Thus, King found that a party’s voluntary testimony resulted in a broad waiver under 
§ 315 extending to “communications made by him to his attorney, pertinent to the 
issue on trial.”40  In explaining that result, King focused on § 315’s express wording 
and perjury-related concerns such as the obligation “to tell the whole truth” and the 
need to be “liable to the application of all the usual tests of truth, and to 
impeachment, like that of any other witness.”41     
                                                          
 
34
 King v. Barrett, 11 Ohio St. 261 (1860). 
 
35
 Id. at 262. 
 
36
 Id. at 262-64. 
 
37
 Id. at 263. 
 
38
 Id. at 263-64.   
 
39






 Id. (italics in original).  
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C.  Duttenhofer v. Ohio (1877) 
In 1867, the Ohio General Assembly eliminated the interested witness rule for 
criminal defendants, making them competent to voluntarily testify on their own 
behalf and bringing Ohio’s criminal law in line with its civil law following the 
passage of § 310 of the 1853 Ohio CCP.42  A decade later, the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, in Duttenhofer v. Ohio, considered whether a criminal defendant’s voluntary 
testimony allowed the prosecution to call the defendant’s attorney and examine him 
regarding otherwise confidential attorney-client communications.43  There, the trial 
court had allowed the prosecution to call and cross-examine the defendant’s attorney 
regarding testimony the defendant had voluntarily provided on direct.44   
Reversing, the Supreme Court of Ohio began by articulating: 
It is . . . a general rule of jurisprudence, that ‘where an attorney is 
employed by a client professionally, to transact professional business, all 
the communications that pass between the client and the attorney in the 
course and for the purpose of that business are privileged 
communications, and that the privilege is the privilege of the client and 
not of the attorney.’45 
Then, after noting that § 315 of the 1853 Ohio CCP “provides, that, if a person offer 
himself as a witness, that is to be deemed a consent to the examination also of the 
attorney, on the same subject,” the court observed that “[t]he code of criminal 
procedure contains no such provision,” and concluded that “no such waiver ought to 
be implied,” which it found to be the majority rule.46   
                                                          
 
42
 Act of Apr. 17, 1867, ch. 1220, 1867 Ohio Laws 260, superseded by Act of May 6, 
1869, ch. 1710, 1869 Ohio Laws 287.  Chapter 1220 provided that: 
Sec. 1.  Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, That in the trial of 
all indictments, complaints and other proceedings against persons charged with the 
commission of crimes or offenses, the person so charged shall, at his own request, but 
not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness; nor shall the neglect or refusal to 
testify create any presumption against him, nor shall any reference be made to, nor 
any comment upon, such neglect or refusal. 
 




 Duttenhofer v. Ohio, 34 Ohio St. 91 (1877). 
 
44
 Id. at 94. 
 
45
 Id. (quoting Herring v. Clobery, 41 Eng. Rep. 565 (1842); Pearse v. Pearse, 63 Eng. 
Rep. 950 (1846)).   
 
46
 Id. at 95.  The Supreme Court of Ohio in Duttenhofer noted that, following privilege 
holders’ voluntary testimony, no waiver of the attorney-client privilege had been found in 
Barker v. Kuhn, 38 Iowa 392 (1874), Bigler v. Reyher, 43 Ind. 112 (1873), Bobo v. Bryson, 21 
Ark. 387 (1860), or Hemenway v. Smith, 28 Vt. 701 (1856), while a waiver had been found in 
Woburn v. Henshaw, 101 Mass. 193 (1869).  Duttenhofer, 34 Ohio St. at 95.   
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D.  The 1878 Ohio Code of Civil Procedure 
In March 1875, the Ohio General Assembly directed the Governor to appoint a 
new commission to revise and consolidate all of Ohio’s statutes.47  Those 
commissioners―Michael A. Daugherty, Luther Day (replaced in February 1876 by 
John S. Brasee), and John W. Okey (replaced in November 1877 by George B. 
Okey)48―were known as the Commissioners to Revise and Consolidate the Statutes 
(“Ohio Revision Commissioners”).49  They divided the statutory universe into 
political, civil, remedial, and penal statutes and addressed the code of civil procedure 
in the remedial section.50 
The Ohio Revision Commissioners prepared a proposed code of civil procedure 
(“1878 Ohio CCP”) which the General Assembly enacted on May 14, 1878,51 
repealing the 1853 Ohio CCP.52  The 1878 Ohio CCP retained the 1853 Ohio CCP’s 
                                                          
 
47
 4 THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF OHIO IN CONTINUATION OF CURWEN’S STATUTES AT 
LARGE AND SWAN & CRITCHFIELD’S REVISED STATUTES ARRANGED IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER 
SHOWING THE ACTS IN FORCE, REPEALED, OBSOLETE OR SUPERSEDED WITH REFERENCES TO THE 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS CONSTRUING THE STATUTES AND A COMPLETE ANALYTICAL INDEX 3452 
(J.R. Sayler ed., 1876) [hereinafter SAYLER]. 
 
48
 Michael A. Daugherty had been an Ohio Senator (1870-72).  HERVEY SCOTT, A 
COMPLETE HISTORY OF FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO 1785-1886, at 112 (Columbus, Sherbert & 
Lilley 1887).  Luther Day had been an Ohio Senator (1863-64) and had served on the Supreme 
Court of Ohio (1865-75).  HISTORY OF PORTAGE COUNTY, OHIO 819 (Chicago, Warner, Beers 
& Co. 1885).  Day resigned from the Ohio Revision Commission to become a member of the 
Supreme Court of Ohio Commission (1876-79).  Id.  He was replaced on the Ohio Revision 
Commission by John S. Brasee.  Edgar B. Kinkead, A Sketch of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 7 
THE GREEN BAG 105, 117 (1895).  John W. Okey resigned from the Ohio Revision 
Commission upon his election to serve on the Supreme Court of Ohio (1878-85).  Id.; Justices 
of the Supreme Court of Ohio 1803 to the Present, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO & THE OHIO 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM, http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/SCO/formerjustices/default.asp (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2011).  John W. Okey was replaced on the Ohio Revision Commission by his 




 SAYLER, supra note 47, at 3452. 
 
50
 1 THE REVISED STATUTES & OTHER ACTS OF A GENERAL NATURE OF THE STATE OF OHIO 
IN FORCE JAN. 1, 1880, at vii (Michael A. Daugherty et al. eds., 1879) [hereinafter REVISED 
STATUTES].   
 
51
 S.B. 115, 63d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1878 Ohio Laws 597.  
 
52
 Id. tit. I, div. III, ch. 3, § 1, 1878 Ohio Laws 597, 794 (repealing the 1853 Ohio CCP).  
Before it was replaced by the 1878 Ohio CCP, § 314 of the 1853 Ohio CCP was amended 
twice.  In 1866, new subparagraphs (6) and (7) were added to what had been § 314 of the 1853 
Ohio CCP, both of which related to estate disputes.  2 SAYLER, supra note 47, at 909.  In 
1870, the attorney-client privilege subparagraph, which had been § 314(4) of the 1853 Ohio 
CCP, was moved to become the third (rather than the fourth) subparagraph and was expanded 
to include physicians.  3 SAYLER, supra note 47, at 2375, 2378-79.  Following the 1870 
amendment, what had been § 314(4) of the 1853 Ohio CCP rendered incompetent to testify 
“[a]n attorney concerning any communication made to him by his client in that relation or his 
advice thereon, without the client’s express consent, or a physician concerning any 
communication made to him by his patients in that relation, or his advice thereon without his 
patient’s consent.”  Id.  Given that § 315 of the 1853 Ohio CCP expressly referred to the “last 
two subdivisions of the preceding section,” one could argue that, after two new subparagraphs 
were added as the “last two subdivisions of the preceding section” in 1866, § 315 no longer 
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rule that interested persons, including parties, were competent to testify.53  And, 
using language very close to that of the current Ohio privilege statute, it provided 
that certain “persons shall not testify in certain respects,” including “[a]n attorney, 
concerning a communication made to him by his client in that relation, or his advice 
to his client,” but “the attorney . . . may testify by express consent of the client . . . ; 
and if the client . . . voluntarily testif[ies], the attorney . . . may be compelled to 
testify on the same subject.”54   
There were differences between the attorney-client privilege provisions in the 
1853 Ohio CCP and the 1878 Ohio CCP.  While one section in the 1853 Ohio 
CCP―§ 314(4)―made attorneys incompetent to testify and 
another―§ 315―provided that the client’s voluntary testimony was “deemed to be 
consent” to examining the attorney on the “same subject,” the 1878 Ohio CCP had 
only a single analogous provision.55  In addition, the 1878 Ohio CCP’s provision was 
not phrased in terms of the attorney being “incompetent” to testify but, instead, 
stated that the attorney “shall not testify,” which is more akin to a privilege.56  
Further, it dropped the “deemed to consent” language that had preceded § 315’s 
directive permitting the attorney to testify on the “same subject” and replaced it with 
“may be compelled to testify on the same subject.”57   
One might attempt to ascribe substance to the 1878 Ohio CCP’s changes in 
statutory language, particularly the elimination of the “deemed to consent” language, 
but it is not clear that those changes can reasonably bear that weight.  Generally, and 
apart from the statutory language itself, there appears to be no written evidence that 
the 1878 Ohio CCP substantially modified the attorney-client privilege provisions of 
the 1853 Ohio CCP.  To the contrary, the session laws adopting the 1878 Ohio CCP 
cite to § 314 and § 315 of the 1853 Ohio CCP in brackets following the 1878 Ohio 
CCP’s attorney-client provision.58  Further, the Ohio Revision Commissioners’ final 
report included a footnote reference to and description of the holding in King v. 
Barrett following § 5241 and made no reference to Duttenhofer v. Ohio, which had 
been decided only one year earlier.59  That report also commented, in the 1878 Ohio 
CCP, “the principal part of the code of civil procedure, prepared by [the 1853 Ohio 
                                                          
applied to attorney-client communications.  That reading, however, ignores § 315’s express 
references to “an attorney, clergyman, or priest,” which likely make it untenable.  
 
53
 S.B. 115 tit. I, div. III, ch. 3, § 1.  That section provided: “All persons are competent 
witnesses except those of unsound mind, and children under ten years of age who appear 
incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are 
examined, or of relating them truly.”  Id. 
 
54
 Id. tit. I, div. III, ch. 3, § 2(1).  
 
55






 Id.  Further, and as a result of the 1870 amendment described in footnote 52, the 1878 
Ohio CCP had a parallel rule for physician-patient communications that was not included in 
section 314 of the 1853 Ohio CCP. 
 
58
 Id. § 2(5). 
 
59
 2 REVISED STATUTES, supra note 50, at 1278.  
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Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings] remain[ed] substantially as it was 
reported by those commissioners in 1853.”60   
For decades after 1878, there were no substantive modifications to Ohio’s 
attorney-client privilege statute, although it was renumbered as part of two general 
statutory reshufflings.  Specifically, Ohio enacted the Ohio Revised Code in 1880, 
which was the first general codification of Ohio statutes,61 and the 1878 Ohio CCP’s 
attorney-client provision became Ohio Revised Code § 5241.  In 1910, Ohio 
rearranged its statutes again, this time into the Ohio General Code,62 and the 
attorney-client privilege statutory provision became Ohio General Code § 11494, but 
there were no substantive changes.63     
E.  Spitzer v. Stallings (1924) 
After Duttenhofer v. Ohio, the Supreme Court of Ohio did not address the issue 
of privilege waiver through voluntary testimony again until 1924, when it decided 
Spitzer v. Stallings.64  The Spitzer plaintiffs alleged that two defendants bought corn 
from them and failed to pay for it.65  One defendant denied that he was a party to the 
sale, but the plaintiffs’ direct testimony described facts that, in their view, 
established his involvement.66  That defendant then attempted to cross-examine the 
                                                          
 
60
 1 REVISED STATUTES, supra note 50, at xi.  
 
61
 See 4 SAYLER, supra note 47, at 3452 (act that provided for codification project that 
resulted in 1880 Ohio Revised Code); see also 1 REVISED STATUTES, supra note 50, at iii-xii 
(Ohio Revision Commissioners’ description of the project to codify Ohio’s statutes). 
 
62
 S.B. 2, 78th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1910), reprinted in 1-4 THE GENERAL 
CODE OF THE STATE OHIO (W.H. Anderson Co. 1910). 
 
63
 As enacted in 1910, the attorney-client privilege statute in OHIO GEN. CODE § 11494 
provided that: 
The following persons shall not testify in certain respects: I.  An attorney, concerning 
a communication made to him by his client in that relation, or his advice to his client; 
or a physician, concerning a communication made to him by his patient in that 
relation, or his advice to his patient.  But attorney or physician may testify by express 
consent of the client or patient; and if the client or patient voluntarily testifies, the 
attorney or physician may be compelled to testify on the same subject. 
3 THE GENERAL CODE OF THE STATE OHIO 2463 (W.H. Anderson Co. 1910).   
 
64
 Spitzer v. Stallings, 142 N.E. 365 (Ohio 1924).  We note that, in 1920, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio made a passing reference to the issue in Swetland v. Miles, 130 N.E. 22, 23 
(Ohio 1920).  Swetland considered whether an attorney could testify about his deceased 
client’s intent during an action to contest the client’s will.  Id.  In analyzing OHIO GEN. CODE § 
11494, the court stated that the Legislature “closed the door of all courts to the receipt” of 
communications between attorney and client “no matter how much light they might throw 
upon the controversy, no matter how much logical connection they may have with the issue of 
facts to be proven or disproven.”  Swetland, 130 N.E. at 23.  But, having closed the door, the 
court noted that the Legislature provided two circumstances where it might be reopened: (1) 
with express consent of the client; and (2) if the client voluntarily testifies.  Id. at 23.  In 
Swetland, however, the parties agreed that neither of the events had occurred.  Id.     
 
65
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plaintiffs about admissions they purportedly had made to their attorney concerning 
the defendant’s lack of involvement in the sale, but the trial court sustained the 
plaintiffs’ privilege objection.67  The defendant also called the plaintiffs’ attorney 
and attempted to explore those issues, but the trial court again sustained a privilege 
objection.68  Finding that the plaintiffs’ voluntary testimony waived their attorney-
client privilege claims under Ohio General Code § 11494, the intermediate appellate 
court reversed, and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed.69 
The Spitzer court framed the issue as “whether a confidential communication 
made by a party to his attorney loses its privilege if such party becomes a voluntary 
witness at the trial and testifies generally to matters necessary to establish his cause 
of action, without referring in any way to the communications between him and his 
attorney.”70  The plaintiffs in Spitzer had argued that Ohio General Code § 11494 
addressed situations in which the client testified about “the subject of the 
communications between client and attorney, and not to the subject of the 
controversy.”71  Rejecting this claim, the court said that the plaintiffs’ argument 
required reading the statute “as if it read thus: ‘If the client voluntarily testifies to 
such communication or advice, the attorney may be compelled to testify on the same 
subject,’” which “construction would be nothing short of judicial legislation, and 
would be putting into the language of the statute something which the Legislature 
omitted.”72  Spitzer acknowledged that the common law and the laws of many other 
states were to the contrary, but found that the issue before it “involve[d] the 
interpretation of a legislative act” and was “a question of the application of language 
entirely free from ambiguity to a given state of facts.”73   
Looking to § 315 of the 1853 Ohio CCP and its own interpretation of § 315 in 
King v. Barrett, the Spitzer court found “that there has been no change of language 
[of § 315] which would make” inapplicable King’s holding that, by testifying 
voluntarily, a party “thereby loses this privilege, and, under [§ 315 of the 1853 Ohio 
CCP], consents to the examination of his attorney touching such admissions as a 
pertinent to the issue.”74  Spitzer also found that a waiver on those facts was required 
by the rule of statutory construction that “[w]here a statute that has been construed 
by the courts has been reenacted in the same, or substantially the same, terms the 
Legislature is presumed to have been familiar with its construction, and to have 
adopted it as part of the law.”75  According to the Spitzer court, the Ohio General 
Assembly reenacted § 315 of the 1853 Ohio CCP in the 1878 Ohio CCP without 
significant modifications and with knowledge of King’s holding; thus, the General 









 Id. at 368. 
 
70






 Id.  
 
73
 Id.  
 
74
 Id. at 367. 
 
75
 Id.  
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Assembly implicitly endorsed and adopted King’s holding.76  Spitzer also rejected 
the claim that Duttenhofer v. Ohio overruled King v. Barrett because Duttenhofer, a 
criminal case, did not apply § 315 of the 1853 Ohio CCP.77  
Spitzer left at least some uncertainty in this area because the court, at the very 
outset, assumed “that the testimony of the attorney, if he were permitted and required 
to divulge the communications, would tend to contradict the testimony of the party 
already offered . . . .”78  Similarly, Spitzer noted that, although “[i]t is said that, if the 
rule of exclusion is not applied, parties many times would not dare to testify at all.  
This can only be so upon the theory that the client has not told his attorney the 
truth.”79  These statements not only reflect the concern about client perjury that was 
at the core of § 315 of the 1853 Ohio CCP, but suggest that, for reasons not fully 
explained in the opinion,80 the Spitzer court may have believed that the plaintiffs had 
perjured themselves in their direct testimony, which, today, might implicate the 
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, as well as an attorney’s ethical 
obligation not to present testimony that is known to be false.81  Nonetheless, Spitzer 
(1) flatly rejected the claim that voluntary testimony waives the attorney-client 
privilege only when the testimony discloses the substance of privileged 
communications, and (2) applied the court’s 1860 decision in King v. Barrett to an 
attorney-client privilege statute that bears little difference from today’s version.82   
F.  Developments After Spitzer and Before 1960 
In 1929, the Ohio General Assembly made the civil rules of evidence applicable 
to criminal actions by amending the General Code so that the “rules of evidence in 
civil causes,” where applicable, “govern in all criminal cases.”83  In the following 
decade, the Supreme Court of Ohio twice addressed claims that voluntary testimony 
waived the physician-patient privilege, first in Harpman v. Devine84 and then in 
Baker v. Industrial Commission of Ohio.85  Although those actions did not involve 
alleged waivers of the attorney-client privilege, Harpman and Baker nonetheless are 
instructive because waivers through voluntary testimony of both the physician-
                                                          
 
76
 Id.  
 
77
 Id.  
 
78
 Id. at 366. 
 
79
 Id. at 368. 
 
80
 The Spitzer defendant apparently made a proffer of the excluded testimony and about 
what the attorney-client communications would show.  Id. at 366.  It is unclear, however, 
what, if any, factual basis the defendant had for that proffer.    
 
81
 See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
 
82
 Changes in the Ohio attorney-client privilege statute after 1924 are discussed infra notes 
102 & 157-58 and accompanying text.  As explained there, those changes are not substantive. 
 
83
 Amended S.B. No. 8, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1929 Ohio Laws 123, 185.  In 
1930, this statute was codified as OHIO GEN. CODE § 13444-1.  Since the 1953 revision of 
Ohio’s statutes, it has been codified as OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.41.   
 
84
 Harpman v. Devine, 10 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 1937). 
 
85
 Baker v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 21 N.E.2d 593 (Ohio 1939). 
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patient and attorney-client privileges were addressed in Ohio General Code § 11494 
(and its predecessors) in the same paragraph and with identical language.86 
In Harpman, decided in 1937, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently 
hung a fire hose so that, when the wind blew, it broke a window and injured the 
plaintiff.87  The plaintiff testified on direct examination about his general health, and 
the trial court sustained a privilege objection to the defendant’s questioning of the 
plaintiff’s physician, which the court of appeals found to have been error.88  The 
Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, finding that voluntary testimony does not create a 
waiver “unless the patient first voluntarily testifies in respect” to “what the patient 
has said to his physician and what the physician has said to the patient.”89  To 
support this conclusion, the court first pointed to a United States Supreme Court 
decision interpreting Arizona’s physician-patient privilege statute.90  Then, the court 
purported to distinguish King v. Barrett and Spitzer v. Stallings because “[t]he 
privilege between physician and patient may be waived but the waiver must be 
distinct and unequivocal” and observed that, “[w]hile statutes in other jurisdictions 
are not in all respects like the Ohio statute, nevertheless the principle regarding a 
waiver is practically the same.”91   
In Baker, decided in 1939, the plaintiff had injured his leg and voluntarily 
testified about his leg’s condition, as well as the fact that he had been referred to a 
particular physician.92  The trial court permitted questioning regarding the plaintiff’s 
communications with that physician.93  The jury returned a defense verdict, the 
plaintiff appealed, and the intermediate appellate court reversed.94  In an opinion 
authored by Justice Myers, who had also authored the majority opinion in Harpman, 
the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed.95  Explaining this result, the court observed 
that “[n]owhere in his direct or voluntary testimony did the plaintiff testify as to any 
                                                          
 
86
 See supra notes 52, 54, & 63.  Although the attorney-client and physician-patient 
privileges both were subject to Ohio General Code § 11494’s provision relating to waiver 
through voluntary testimony, the physician-patient privilege is more easily and routinely 
waived than the attorney-client privilege.  This is true because, in actions involving personal 
injuries, the plaintiff’s filing of the action places his or her physical condition at issue and, 
thus, waives the physician-patient privilege.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2317.02(B)(1)(a)(iii) (West 2011).  While the attorney-client privilege and physician-patient 
privilege were addressed in the same paragraph of Ohio’s privilege statute from the time the 
physician-patient privilege was added in 1870, the physician-patient privilege was moved to a 
separate paragraph in 1975.  Amended Substitute H.B. No. 682, 111th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess., 1975 Ohio Laws 2809, 2813 (moving physician-patient privilege to a new paragraph 
(B) and relettering other paragraphs).      
 
87
 Harpman, 10 N.E.2d at 777. 
 
88
 Id. at 777-78. 
 
89
 Id. at 779. 
 
90
 Id. (quoting Ariz. & N.M. Ry. Co. v. Clark, 235 U.S. 669, 676 (1915)).   
 
91
 Id. at 780. 
 
92






 Id.  
 
95
 Id. at 597. 
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oral communications between himself and [the physician].  Because he did not 
voluntarily testify as to any oral communications, there was no waiver in respect to 
such subject.”96   
As Justice Zimmerman pointed out in his dissents in both cases, Harpman and 
Baker clearly rejected a rule that merely testifying voluntarily results in a waiver as 
to all issues on which there is voluntary testimony and, instead, applied a rule that a 
waiver occurs only when voluntary testimony discloses privileged 
communications.97  As explained in Part IV below, this is a perfectly sensible rule, 
but it was one that King and Spitzer considered at some length and rejected as being 
inconsistent with the statutory language.98  
In the 1940s and 1950s, some intermediate Ohio appellate courts applied the rule 
in Harpman,99 while others followed Spitzer.100  In addition, Ohio rearranged its 
statutes again in 1953, and Ohio General Code § 11494 became Ohio Revised Code 
§ 2317.02.  Although the physician-patient privilege has since been moved to a 
separate paragraph, substantially modified,101 and there have been other changes to 
                                                          
 
96
 Id. at 596. 
 
97
 Harpman, 10 N.E.2d at 781-82 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting); Baker, 21 N.E.2d at 597 
(Zimmerman, J., dissenting). 
 
98
 Compare Harpman, 10 N.E.2d at 779 (“Not having voluntarily testified respecting any 
‘communications’ or ‘advice’ from Dr. Fusselman, there was no waiver under the statute.”), 
and Baker, 21 N.E.2d at 597 (“[With] respect to any oral communications between the 
plaintiff and Dr. Phillips there was no waiver for the reason that the plaintiff had not 
voluntarily testified in respect thereto.”), with King v. Barrett, 11 Ohio St. 261, 264 (1860) 
(“In the case before us, Barrett, being a party, voluntarily offered himself as a witness 
generally, in his own behalf.  In so doing, he waived all the protection which the law would 
otherwise have afforded to communications made by him to his attorney, pertinent to the issue 
on trial.”), and Spitzer v. Stillings, 142 N.E.2d 365, 366 (Ohio 1924) (“If the Legislature 
meant the word ‘subject’ to be confined to the subject of the communication between the 
client and the attorney, it could easily have so stated, and, in the absence of that limitation, it 




 See Foley v. Poschke, 32 N.E.2d 858, 861 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949) (“Although the 
Supreme Court of Ohio, in its opinion [in Harpman], states that [King and Spitzer] can be 
distinguished, it is not easy to distinguish them . . . .  We deem it our duty follow the decision 
in the Harpman case . . . as being the latest expression of the Supreme Court of Ohio on this 
question.”), aff’d on other grounds, 31 N.E.2d 845 (Ohio 1941). 
 
100
 See In re Roberto, 151 N.E.2d 37, 41 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958) (“The rule should be . . . that 
when a patient testifies voluntarily for the purpose of perpetuating testimony by way of 
deposition as has been related herein, but does not testify as to the physician’s findings upon 
examination and his diagnosis of her condition, . . . that the physician can be required to 
answer inquiries relating thereto because the patient waived the privilege attaching thereto by 
testifying generally to her condition and treatment.”); Rospert v. Old Fort Mills, Inc., 78 
N.E.2d 909, 913 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) (“When the plaintiff offered himself as a witness as to 
the value of the use, then any statement he made to his attorney as to the value of the use is 
not protected by Section 11494, General Code.”).  
 
101
 See Amended Substitute H.B. No. 682, 111th Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1975 Ohio 
Laws 2809, 2813 (moving physician-patient privilege to a new paragraph (B)); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B) (West 2010) (current version of physician-patient privilege). 
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the attorney-client privilege statute,102 the language relating to the effect of voluntary 
testimony on the attorney-client privilege that is the focus of this Article has 
remained the same.  
III.  RECENT DECISIONS ADDRESSING WAIVER THROUGH VOLUNTARY TESTIMONY 
A rule that a client’s voluntary testimony, even if no privileged communications 
are disclosed, waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to subjects addressed 
in the testimony is highly unusual in the United States.  In the middle of the 
twentieth century, at least five other states had privilege statutes that were, in this 
respect, similar to Ohio’s: North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and 
Wyoming.103  Since then, all of those states except Wyoming have adopted new 
                                                          
 
102
 See infra notes 157 & 158.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 now provides that “[t]he 
following persons shall not testify in certain respects:” 
(A)(1) An attorney, concerning a communication made to the attorney by a client in 
that relation or the attorney’s advice to a client, except that the attorney may testify by 
express consent of the client or, if the client is deceased, by the express consent of the 
surviving spouse or the executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased client. 
However, if the client voluntarily testifies or is deemed by section 2151.421 of the 
Revised Code to have waived any testimonial privilege under this division, the 
attorney may be compelled to testify on the same subject. 
 
The testimonial privilege established under this division does not apply concerning a 
communication between a client who has since died and the deceased client’s attorney 
if the communication is relevant to a dispute between parties who claim through that 
deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession 
or by inter vivos transaction, and the dispute addresses the competency of the 
deceased client when the deceased client executed a document that is the basis of the 
dispute or whether the deceased client was a victim of fraud, undue influence, or 
duress when the deceased client executed a document that is the basis of the dispute. 
 
(2) An attorney, concerning a communication made to the attorney by a client in that 
relationship or the attorney’s advice to a client, except that if the client is an insurance 
company, the attorney may be compelled to testify, subject to an in camera inspection 
by a court, about communications made by the client to the attorney or by the attorney 
to the client that are related to the attorney’s aiding or furthering an ongoing or future 
commission of bad faith by the client, if the party seeking disclosure of the 
communications has made a prima facie showing of bad faith, fraud, or criminal 




 The collection of state attorney-client privilege statutes in the 1961 edition of 
Wigmore’s treatise Evidence in Trials at Common Law reflected that North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wyoming had attorney-client privilege statutes that 
were, in this respect, similar to Ohio’s.  8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON 
LAW § 2292 n.2 (John T. McNaughton rev., Little, Brown & Co. 1961) (quoting N.D. REV. 
CODE § 31-0107 (1943) (“‘If a person testifies as a witness to any subject which comes within 
the protection’ of [the statutory attorney-client privilege], ‘it is a consent to his attorney’s 
examination on the same subject matter.’”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 385 (West 1959) 
(“The following persons shall be incompetent to testify: . . . 4. An attorney, concerning any 
communications made to him by his client, in that relation, or his advice thereon, without the 
client’s consent. . . . 6. . . . Provided, that if a person offer himself as a witness, that is to be 
deemed a consent to the examination; also, if an attorney . . . on the same subject.”); OR. REV. 
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statutes or rules that do not provide that a client testifying voluntarily results in a 
privilege waiver.104   
Indeed, we suspect this rule is largely unknown, even to most attorneys 
practicing in Ohio courts, and that it is invoked in only a very small percentage of 
instances in which it potentially might be applied.  Certainly, the current statutory 
language does not highlight the issue and could be construed to support a rule that 
waivers occur only when voluntary testimony discloses the substance of otherwise 
privileged communications.  Further, when both sides are offering voluntary 
testimony, rational litigants could easily decide that the potential costs of advancing 
this argument outweigh the likely benefits based on a “mutually assured destruction” 
rationale.  For at least these reasons, parties in proceedings in Ohio courts rarely seek 
to invoke this rule, and decisions where it is applied are uncommon.  
Nonetheless, in recent years courts applying Ohio law have applied the waiver 
through voluntary testimony rule on multiple occasions.  For example, in 1983, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio applied the rule in Westervelt v. Rooker.105  There, the 
                                                          
STAT. § 44.040(2) (1957) (“If a party . . . offers himself as a witness, it is deemed a consent to 
the examination also of [his] . . . attorney . . . on the same subject.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 36.0102 (1939) (“If a person offer himself as a witness he thereby waives any privilege he 
might otherwise claim, which would prevent the examination of his attorney . . . on the same 
subject.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-2602 (1945) (“The following persons shall not testify in 
certain respects: 1. An attorney, concerning a communication made to him by his client in that 
relation, or his advice to his client; . . . but the attorney . . . may testify by express consent of 
the client . . . ; and if the client . . . voluntarily testify, the attorney . . . may be compelled to 
testify, on the same subject.”)).  Most courts interpreting these statutes have found broad 
privilege waivers based on voluntary client testimony.  E.g., Sitton v. Peyree, 241 P. 62, 65 
(Or. 1925) (under Oregon’s attorney-client privilege statute, the client “removed the seal of 
secrecy by taking the witness stand in his own behalf”); Gerlinger v. Frank, 145 P. 1069, 1070 
(Or. 1915) (affirming trial court’s decision to allow an attorney to testify because the client 
had already testified on the same subject); In re Young’s Estate, 116 P. 95, 97 (Or. 1911) (the 
client “having voluntarily gone upon the stand as a witness upon the general subject, waived 
the right” to object to the examination of the client’s attorney on that same subject).  Others, 
however, read the statutes more narrowly to require that the client’s testimony disclose the 
otherwise privileged communications.  E.g., Hudson v. Blanchard, 294 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1956) 
(patient waived physician-patient privilege only when voluntary testimony referenced the 




 North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota have adopted attorney-client 
privilege statutes or rules based on Rules 502 and 510 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.  
N.D. R. EVID. 502, 511 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2502 & 2511 (West 2011); 
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 40.225 & 40.280 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13-1 to -5, 19-13-26 
to -27 (2011).  As reflected in footnote 162 below, Rules 502 and 510 of the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence do not provide that voluntarily testifying waives the attorney-client privilege.  
Wyoming’s statute, although renumbered, has not changed in this respect.  WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1-12-101 (2011) (“(a) The following persons shall not testify in certain respects: (i) An 
attorney or a physician concerning a communication made to him by his client or patient in 
that relation, or his advice to his client or patient.  The attorney or physician may testify by 
express consent of the client or patient, and if the client or patient voluntarily testifies the 
attorney or physician may be compelled to testify on the same subject.”).  We have not located 
decisions explaining the scope of waiver covered by the phrase “on the same subject” in the 
Wyoming statute.  
 
105
 Westervelt v. Rooker, 447 N.E.2d 1307 (Ohio 1983). 
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plaintiff testified at trial regarding his version of the accident that was at issue.106  
Over an objection, defense counsel on cross-examination was permitted to ask about 
the plaintiff’s discussions with his counsel that had occurred during a recess.107  
Following a defense verdict, the plaintiff appealed, and the court of appeals reversed 
based in part on its conclusion that the trial court erred in permitting inquiry into the 
attorney-client communications that occurred during the recess.108  The Supreme 
Court of Ohio reversed the intermediate appellate court.109  Citing Spitzer and King, 
the court disposed of this issue in two sentences:  
[P]revious pronouncements of this court have held that where a party 
testifies in any trial, such party may be cross-examined by the opposing 
party concerning communication with his attorney on any subject 
pertinent to his claim or defense, even though the fact of communications 
that have passed between them has not been referred to by such party in 
direct examination.  Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly 
permitted the cross-examination.110 
In 2002, an intermediate Ohio appellate court applied the waiver through 
voluntary testimony rule in Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A. v. Cardiothoracic & 
Vascular Surgery of Akron.111  Amer Cunningham involved a dispute between a law 
firm and its former client over unpaid legal fees.112  During discovery, the plaintiff 
law firm subpoenaed Frank Lettieri, an attorney formerly employed at the firm who 
had performed legal services for the defendant.113  Lettieri moved to quash the 
subpoena based on the attorney-client privilege and the work product protection.114  
                                                          
 
106
 Id. at 1307. 
 
107
 Id. at 1310. 
 
108






 Id. (citations omitted).  The fact that the attorney-client communications at issue in 
Westervelt occurred during a recess while the plaintiff was testifying could, depending on the 
facts, have provided a different basis for overcoming the privilege.  Many courts bar 
communications between the witness and others, including the witness’s attorney, during 
recesses under the so-called “rule on witnesses.”  See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989) 
(judge’s bar on communications between criminal defendant and his counsel during 15-minute 
recess did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Hall v. Clifton 
Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (in civil action, barring communications with 
counsel during breaks in deposition); but see Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (bar 
on communications between defendant and his counsel during overnight recess that occurred 
during his testimony denied defendant his Sixth Amendment right to counsel).  Although there 
is no indication in the Supreme Court of Ohio’s opinion that such an instruction was given by 
the Westervelt trial court, if one was given, then violating the trial court’s order would have 
been an independent basis for ordering disclosure.     
 
111
 Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A. v. Cardiothoracic & Vascular Surgery of Akron, No. 
20899, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4182, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2002). 
 
112
 Id. at *1. 
 
113
 Id. at *2. 
 
114
 Id.  
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The law firm then moved to compel, and the trial court granted the motion, finding 
that the deposition testimony of defendant’s president had waived the privilege.115   
On appeal, Lettieri argued that the testimony of defendant’s president did not 
waive the privilege because it occurred during cross-examination in a deposition 
and, thus, was not “voluntary” under Ohio Revised Code § 2317.02(A).116  Rejecting 
a bright line rule that testimony given on cross-examination is not voluntary, the 
appellate court held that whether testimony elicited on cross-examination is 
“voluntary” for these purposes requires “a court . . . [to] consider the facts of the case 
before it, specifically the questions and answers from the deposition, and then decide 
if the testimony concerning the relevant information was voluntary.”117  Based on the 
incomplete record before it, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s waiver 
ruling, finding that the defendant had failed to establish that the testimony was not 
“voluntary.”118  Thus, under the Amer Cunningham rationale, merely submitting to 
cross-examination in a deposition could result in a waiver through voluntary 
testimony under Ohio Revised Code § 2317.02(A).119 
In 2008, another intermediate Ohio appellate court applied the waiver through 
voluntary testimony rule in Air-Ride, Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., a breach of 
contract action.120  There, the defendant produced a two-page e-mail between one of 
its in-house counsel and an employee.121  The plaintiff’s counsel discovered the e-
mail and notified the defendant’s counsel, who moved for its return as having been 
inadvertently produced, when the plaintiff’s counsel refused to return it.122  The trial 
court denied the defendant’s motion based on its conclusion that, by attaching an 
affidavit that addressed the same subjects to a motion for summary judgment, the 
                                                          
 
115
 Id.  The appellate court’s description of Dr. Kamienski’s deposition is brief, but 
apparently he answered questions about discussions he had had with Lettieri.  Id. at *8.  
According to the appellate court, Dr. Kamienski answered all of the posed questions without 
the imposition of any objections on privilege grounds, discussed the requested topics, and 
clarified his answers when necessary.  Id. at *9. 
 
116






 Id. at *9-10.   
 
119
 Other Ohio courts have held that testimony given on cross-examination is not voluntary 
testimony and does not constitute a waiver of the privilege under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2317.02 (West 2011).  E.g., Carver v. Deerfield Twp., 742 N.E.2d 1182, 1190 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2000) (holding that testimony provided during a deposition upon cross-examination is 
not voluntary testimony and does not result in waiver of the attorney-client privilege under 
OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02); Woyczynski v. Wolf, 464 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) 
(“waiver of the privilege will not be presumed from the fact that the client was called to testify 
as on cross-examination, because this is not considered to be ‘voluntary testimony’ within the 
meaning of the statute”); but see Rubel v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 626, 
628-29 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (when party elected to introduce issue during his deposition on 
cross-examination and testimony was not forced from him, the party waived the attorney-
client privilege under OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02).   
 
120
 Air-Ride, Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., No. 2008-01-001, 2008-Ohio-5669, ¶ 2 






 Id. ¶ 4. 
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defendant had waived the attorney-client privilege under Ohio Revised Code 
§ 2317.02(A).123  
Affirming, the appellate court noted that, before the e-mail was produced, the 
defendant had submitted an affidavit in support of a summary judgment motion that 
addressed the same subject matters that were the focus of the two-page e-mail at 
issue.124  Looking to definitions of “testimony” articulated in Crawford v. 
Washington,125 which addressed the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause,126 the 
Air-Ride court concluded that the defendant’s summary judgment affidavit was 
“testimony” for purposes of Ohio Revised Code § 2317.02(A).127  Thus, the court 
concluded that, “[w]hen the affidavit was filed, [the defendant] waived any claimed 
privilege over attorney-client communications on that particular subject.”128 
As the decisions in Westervelt, Amer Cunningham, and Air-Ride reflect, there is a 
meaningful risk that a court could find that, under Ohio Revised Code § 2317.02(A), 
a client’s voluntary testimony waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to 
otherwise privileged communications relating to the subject matters on which the 
client testifies.  And, as discussed above, there is some support for this result in Ohio 
Revised Code § 2317.02(A)’s language, the legislative history (such as it is), and the 
Supreme Court of Ohio’s decisions in King and Spitzer.129  Furthermore, the Amer 
                                                          
 
123
 Id.  The trial court also found that, on those facts, the inadvertent production resulted in 
a waiver under a five-factor balancing analysis.  Id.  The intermediate appellate court affirmed 
that determination.  Id. ¶ 29. 
 
124
 Id. ¶ 11. 
 
125
 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 
126
 In Crawford, the trial court had, over the defendant’s objection that it violated the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, permitted the prosecution to play a police tape recording 
of the defendant’s wife because there were sufficient indicia of reliability to pass muster under 
the hearsay rules.  Id. at 40.  The Court found that, “even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely 
concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, and interrogations by law 
enforcement officers falls squarely within that class.”  Id. at 53 (footnote omitted).  It then 
reversed the defendant’s conviction because “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue, . . . the 
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”  Id. at 68.   
 
127
 Air-Ride, Inc., 2008-Ohio-5669, ¶¶ 9, 11. 
 
128
 Id. ¶ 11; see also Rubel v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 626, 628 (N.D. 
Ohio 2008) (party’s affidavit testimony waived the attorney-client privilege “as to any subject 
to which he testified and pertinent to his claim”); Gialousis v. Eye Care Assoc., Inc., No. 05 
MA 163, 2007-Ohio-120, ¶¶ 20, 24 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2007) (voluntary testimony 




 There are, of course, substantial counterarguments.  For example, one could advocate a 
different rule based on: (1) the Supreme Court’s rulings in Harpman and Baker; (2) the claim 
that the 1878 Ohio CCP’s wording was substantively different from § 315 of the 1853 Ohio 
CCP and, thus, they can be read differently; (3) the claim that Spitzer appeared to assume that 
the clients had perjured themselves, which today could have allowed the same result by, 
perhaps, the crime-fraud exception; and (4) the policy arguments outlined in the next section.  
Further, while the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the Ohio attorney-client privilege statute 
departed from and was contrary to the common law in this context in King and Spitzer, the 
court has imported common law concepts into Ohio’s law of privilege in other contexts.  See, 
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Cunningham and Air-Ride courts took expansive approaches to defining when the 
“client voluntarily testifies” for purposes of Ohio Revised Code § 2317.02(A), which 
creates additional risk and uncertainty.     
IV.  AN ASSESSMENT OF THE WAIVER THROUGH VOLUNTARY TESTIMONY RULE 
Assuming the rule in Ohio is that when a client voluntarily testifies he or she 
waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to otherwise privileged 
communications that relate to the same subject matters, can such a rule be reconciled 
with, and does it further, the policies that underlie the attorney-client privilege?  As 
detailed below, in our view, it does not for multiple reasons. 
First, the basic purpose of the attorney-client privilege is “to encourage ‘full and 
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote 
broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of 
justice.’”130  It “is founded on the premise that confidences shared in the attorney-
client relationship are to remain confidential.”131  “[B]y protecting client 
communications designed to obtain legal advice or assistance, the client will be more 
candid and will disclose all relevant information to his attorney, even potentially 
damaging and embarrassing facts.”132  As Chief Justice Burger observed in Upjohn 
Co. v. United States:133  
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the 
attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty 
whether particular discussions will be protected.  An uncertain privilege, 
or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying 
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.134  
The waiver through voluntary testimony rule seriously undermines these policies.  
At the time of the attorney-client communication, it is nearly impossible for either 
the attorney or the client to reliably assess whether the client will need to testify 
voluntarily on the same subjects at some point in the future.  This is particularly true 
given that “voluntary testimony” may extend to simply responding to cross-
examination in a deposition, as it did in Amer Cunningham.135   
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Swidler & Berlin136 is 
instructive.  There, Vincent Foster, who worked in the Clinton White House, had 
met with his personal attorney shortly before Foster committed suicide, and the 
                                                          
e.g., Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 937 N.E.2d 533, 538-44 
(Ohio 2010) (describing multiple common law exceptions to Ohio’s attorney-client privilege). 
 
130
 Ohio ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Toledo-Lucas Cnty. Port Auth., 905 N.E.2d 1221, 
1226 (Ohio 2009) (quoting Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998)).    
 
131
 Id. (quoting Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 349 (Ohio 1994)).    
 
132
 Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, 937 N.E.2d at 537 (quoting State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio 
Hous. Fin. Agency, 824 N.E.2d 990, 994 (Ohio 2005)).   
 
133
 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
 
134
 Id. at 393.  
 
135
 See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text. 
 
136
 Swidler, 524 U.S. 399. 
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Independent Counsel sought Foster’s attorney’s notes.137  The Independent Counsel 
contended that the privilege should give way when communications are sought 
posthumously in a criminal investigation and that such a rule would have “minimal 
impact.”138  The Court disagreed, observing that:  
[A] client may not know at the time he discloses information to his 
attorney whether it will later be relevant to a civil or a criminal matter, let 
alone whether it will be of substantial importance.  Balancing ex post the 
importance of the information against client interests, even limited to 
criminal cases, introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege’s 
application.  For just that reason, we have rejected use of a balancing test 
in defining the contours of the privilege.139   
Separately, the Independent Counsel argued that, given the number of exceptions 
to the privilege, “the impact of one more exception” would be “marginal.”140  Again, 
the Court did not agree:  
The established exceptions [to the privilege] are consistent with the 
purposes of the privilege, while a posthumous exception in criminal cases 
appears at odds with the goals of encouraging full and frank 
communication and of protecting the client’s interests.  A “no harm in one 
more exception” rationale could contribute to the general erosion of the 
privilege.141 
A rule that voluntary testimony waives the privilege, like the exception the 
Independent Counsel proposed in Swidler & Berlin, is not “consistent with the 
purposes of the privilege” and “appears at odds with the goals of encouraging full 
and frank communication and of protecting the client’s interests.”142   
Second, the policy that the waiver through voluntary testimony rule was designed 
to further―reducing the risk that witnesses will commit perjury―can be (and is) 
served in several other ways.  To the extent that a client commits perjury, the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, if properly invoked and established, 
may strip away the privilege from communications that were made in contemplation 
and furtherance of the perjury.143  Ethics rules bar attorneys from “offer[ing] 
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false” and, if the lawyer “has offered material 
evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take 
reasonable measures to remedy the situation, including, if necessary, disclosure to 
                                                          
 
137
 Id. at 401-02. 
 
138
 Id. at 408. 
 
139












 See generally Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 937 
N.E.2d 533, 538-39 (Ohio 2010); Boone v. Vanliner Ins. Co., 744 N.E.2d 154 (Ohio 2001) 
(superseded by statute); Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1994); see 
also United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).   
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the tribunal.”144  Furthermore, the safeguards for discerning the truth that were 
advanced in support of abolishing the witness rule in the first half of the nineteenth 
century―the ability to subject testimony to cross-examination and the fact finder’s 
awareness of a witness’s interests―continue to apply.145   
Third, for criminal defendants the waiver through voluntary testimony rule 
creates substantial tension between the right to testify on the one hand, and the right 
to counsel on the other.  Duttenhofer found that the waiver through voluntary 
testimony rule did not apply in a criminal action, but reached that conclusion 
because § 315 of the 1853 Ohio CCP applied only in civil proceedings.146  Since the 
enactment of the predecessor to Ohio Revised Code § 2945.11 in 1929, that no 
longer is true.  Thus, in Ohio v. Crissman,147 the Ohio appellate court proceeded 
cautiously, noting that “if the defendant in a criminal case voluntarily testifies, his 
attorney may be compelled to testify on the same subject unless barred by 
constitutional rights of the defendant.”148  Crissman then noted that, “as a matter of 
good practice, the use of defense counsel as a witness for the state should be avoided 
where at all possible in criminal cases” and, when “circumstances justify . . . use of 
defense counsel as a witness for the state,” it should be “for limited purposes.”149  
Even assuming the prosecutors follow this “good practice,” it may be difficult to 
determine whether a defendant chose to forego taking the witness stand based on a 
concern that if he or she did, the prosecution would have the unfettered right to 
cross-examine defense counsel on the same subjects. 
V.  POSSIBLE CHANGES TO OHIO’S PRIVILEGE STATUTE 
Ohio’s privilege statute, Ohio Revised Code § 2317.02, is something of a 
hodgepodge.  The statute has been amended nearly thirty times in the past thirty-five 
years.150  For over a hundred years until the mid-1970s, it had addressed only four 
privileges: those for communications between (1) attorneys and clients; (2) doctors 
and patients; (3) clergymen and penitents; and (4) husbands and wives.151  Since the 
mid-1970s, the statute has been amended to recognize new privileges for 
communications with (1) podiatrists and osteopaths;152 (2) school guidance 
                                                          
 
144
 OHIO R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.3(a)(3) (2011) (italics in original).   
 
145
 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.   
 
146
 Duttenhofer v. State, 34 Ohio St. 91, 95 (1877).  
 
147
 State v. Crissman, 287 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971).   
 
148
 Id. at 649 (emphasis added). 
 
149
 Id.  
 
150
 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (West 2010) (explaining legislative history). 
 
151
 3 SAYLER, supra note 47, at 2375, 2378-79.  The 1853 Ohio CCP addressed 
communications between husbands and wives (§ 314(3)), attorneys and clients (§ 314(4)), and 
clergymen or priests and penitents (§ 314(5)).  Id.  In 1870, the paragraph in § 314 addressing 
attorneys and clients was expanded to also include communications between physicians and 
patients.  Id.      
 
152
 Amended H.B. 1426, 111th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1976 Ohio Laws 3840, 3843 
(amending OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02(B) to expressly include podiatrists and osteopaths). 
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counselors;153 (3) chiropractors;154 (4) critical stress management teams;155 and (5) 
employee assistance professionals.156  Further, three amendments have modified the 
conditions under which the attorney-client privilege is waived or inapplicable,157 and 
another addressed the application of the attorney-client privilege in the context of 
insurance bad faith claims.158        
Notwithstanding the General Assembly’s “tweaking” in recent decades, Ohio’s 
attorney-client privilege statute is a partial, antiquated codification that coexists with, 
but does not replace, the common law attorney-client privilege.159  Ohio’s privilege 
                                                          
 
153
 Amended Substitute H.B. 205, 115th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1984 Ohio Laws 2246, 
2247-48 (adding new paragraph (G) to OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02 relating to communications 
with school guidance counselors).  See also Amended Substitute H.B. 374, 124th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2002 Ohio Laws 10042, 10057 (expanding types of counselors subject to 
OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02(G)). 
 
154
 Substitute H.B. 506, 123d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Ohio Laws 5453, 5469-70 
(adding, among other things, new paragraph (J) to OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02 recognizing 
privilege for communications with chiropractors).  See also Amended Substitute S.B. 281, 
124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2002 Ohio Laws 3791, 3815-17 (making minor 
modifications to OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02(J)). 
 
155
 Substitute S.B. 19, 126th Gen. Assemb., Gen. Sess., 2005 Ohio Laws 639, 646 (adding, 
among other things, new paragraph (K) to OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02 relating to 
communications with critical stress management team members).  
 
156
 Id. (adding, among other things, new paragraph (L) to OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02 
relating to communications with employee assistance professionals).  
 
157
 Amended H.B. 576, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1953 Ohio Laws 313 (amending 
OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02(A) to allow surviving spouse or executor to waive privilege for 
deceased clients); Amended Substitute H.B. 529, 116th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1988 Ohio 
Laws 4865, 4871 (making the waiver provisions of what now is OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.421, 
which relates to reporting child neglect and abuse, applicable to waive the attorney-client 
privilege under OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02(A)); Substitute H.B. 144, 126th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess., 2006 Ohio Laws 5941, 5942 (adding new paragraph to OHIO REV. CODE 
§ 2317.02(A) making the attorney-client privilege inapplicable to deceased client’s 




 Amended Substitute S.B. No. 117, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2006 Ohio Laws 
2274, 2281 (adding new subparagraph (2) to OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02(A) relating to 
insurance bad faith claims and making former paragraph (A) new subparagraph (A)(1)).   
 
159
 Very generally, communications that fall within the express language of the attorney-
client privilege statute, OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02, are governed by the statute, but, if the 
statute does not apply, the common law applies.  Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. 
Givaudan Flavors Corp., 937 N.E.2d 533, 538 (Ohio 2010) (citing State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio 
House Fin. Agency, 824 N.E.2d 990, 994 (Ohio 2005)).  Thus, if the statutory privilege 
applies, it typically governs the scope of the privilege.  See State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. 
Toledo-Lucas Cnty. Port Auth., 905 N.E.2d 1221, 1227 (Ohio 2009).  And, in situations not 
addressed by OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02, the common law generally defines the nature and 
scope of the privilege.  Id.; see also State v. McDermott, 651 N.E.2d 985, 987-88 (Ohio 1995) 
(discussing distinctions between scope of statutory and common law attorney-client 
privilege); Grace v. Mastruserio, 912 N.E.2d 608, 612-15 (Ohio App. Ct. 2007) (same).  
Further, Ohio courts have incorporated common-law concepts into their interpretations of the 
statutory attorney-client privilege.  E.g., Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., 937 N.E.2d at 
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statute raises several practical problems for Ohio practitioners.  For example, Ohio 
courts have found that the identical language means different things in different 
paragraphs of Ohio Revised Code § 2317.02.160  Moreover, because the attorney-
client privilege is governed by statute in some situations and common law in others, 
the scope of the privilege can vary greatly depending on which set of rules govern in 
a particular scenario.161   
                                                          
544 (stating that “Ohio recognizes common-law exceptions to the privilege” and identifying 
common-law exceptions to the privilege); Moskovitz v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 
331, 349 (Ohio 1994) (noting that the statutory privilege does not apply when the advice 
sought by the client relates to a future unlawful transaction); Lemley v. Kaiser, 452 N.E.2d 
1304, 1310 (Ohio 1983) (observing that “[i]n the determination [of] whether a communication 
by a client to an attorney should be afforded the cloak of privilege, much ought to depend on 
the circumstances of each case” and looking to decisions from New York and Pennsylvania 




 Compare supra Part II.F (discussing Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis of the phrase “on 
the same subject” in context of the physician-patient privilege) with supra Parts II.B-C & E 
(discussing Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis of the same phrase in the context of the attorney-
client privilege).  Indeed, in his dissent in Harpman, Justice Zimmerman noted that the 
majority’s interpretation of the phrase “on the same subject” in the subsection of Ohio’s 
privilege statute addressing communications between doctors and patients was “expressly 
disapproved” by the Ohio Supreme Court in Spitzer when it was analyzing the meaning of the 
same phrase in the subsection of the statute addressing communications between attorneys and 
clients.  Harpman v. Devine, 10 N.E.2d 776, 782 (Ohio 1937) (Zimmerman, J., dissenting). 
 
161
 A communication’s privileged status has been found to depend on whether the statutory 
or common law privilege applies.  For example, in State v. Post a criminal defense attorney 
employed a polygraph examiner to examine his client in preparation for the defense in a 
murder case.  State v. Post, 513 N.E.2d 754, 760 (Ohio 1987).  During the examination, the 
client confessed to the murder.  Id.  During a hearing on a motion in limine, the client’s 
cellmate testified that the client told him that he had confessed to the polygraph examiner.  Id.  
The prosecutor then sought to question the polygraph examiner about the client’s confession.  
Id.  The trial court held that, while the client’s communications to the polygraph examiner 
may have been initially privileged, by disclosing their contents to the cellmate, a third party, 
the client waived any privilege associated with them.  Id.  The Supreme Court of Ohio 
affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating that “[w]e hold that a client’s disclosure to a third 
party of communications made pursuant to the attorney-client privilege breaches the 
confidentiality underlying the privilege, and constitutes a waiver thereof.”  Id. at 761. 
  In contrast, in State v. McDermott, which also involved a murder trial and a disclosure 
of privileged communications to a third party, the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that there 
was no waiver of the privilege.  State v. McDermott, 651 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ohio 1995).  
There, the police arrested McDermott five years after the murder of Elmwood McKown.  Id. 
at 986.  The prosecutor subpoenaed the attorney who had represented McDermott at the time 
of the murder to testify about conversations he had with McDermott immediately after the 
murder.  Id.  During pre-trial hearings to determine whether the attorney-client privilege had 
been waived, the prosecutor called two witnesses to the stand who testified that McDermott 
had told them that he had admitted to his attorney that he had killed McKown.  Id.  When the 
prosecutor called the attorney to the stand at the trial, the attorney refused to answer the 
prosecutor’s questions for which he was held in contempt and jailed for two days.  Id.  The 
Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the trial court’s decision.  Id. at 988.  The court stated that, 
under OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02(A), there are only two ways to waive the attorney-client 
privilege: (1) the client expressly consents, or (2) the client voluntarily testifies.  Id. at 987.  
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Rather than further amending Ohio’s oft-modified privilege statute that, in many 
respects, dates back over a hundred years, one solution would be for the General 
Assembly to repeal the current attorney-client privilege statute and replace it with a 
modern, reasonably comprehensive attorney-client privilege rule based on Rules 502 
and 510 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.162  Under Rules 502 and 510 of the 
                                                          
Because the statute provides the exclusive means by which privileged communications 
directly between an attorney and a client can be waived and it was undisputed that McDermott 
neither consented nor voluntarily testified, the court held that McDermott did not waive the 
privilege by disclosing the content of his communications with his attorney to multiple third 
parties.  Id. at 988. 
  McDermott recognized a tension with Post, but distinguished Post because Post 
involved a communication between a client and an agent of an attorney (i.e., the polygraph 
examiner), which “are not protected by the statute” and, instead, are governed by common 
law.  Id. at 987-88.  Under the common law, the privilege may be waived by disclosing the 
content of privileged communications to a third party.  Id.  In contrast, the communications in 
issue in McDermott were directly between an attorney and his client, and so, pursuant to OHIO 
REV. CODE § 2317.02(A), could be waived only with McDermott’s express consent or by him 
voluntarily testifying on the same subject matter.  Id. 
 
162
 Rule 502, governing lawyer-client privilege, provides: 
 (a) Definitions.  In this rule: (1) “Client” means a person for whom a lawyer renders 
professional legal services or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining 
professional legal services from the lawyer.  (2) A communication is “confidential” if 
it is not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure 
is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or 
those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.  (3) “Lawyer” 
means a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to 
engage in the practice of law in any State or country.  (4) “Representative of the 
client” means a person having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act 
on legal advice rendered, on behalf of the client or a person who, for the purpose of 
effectuating legal representation for the client, makes or receives a confidential 
communication while acting in the scope of employment for the client.  (5) 
“Representative of the lawyer” means a person employed, or reasonably believed by 
the client to be employed, by the lawyer to assist the lawyer in rendering professional 
legal services.   
 
(b) General rule of privilege.  A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential communication made for the 
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client: (1) 
between the client or a representative of the client and the client’s lawyer or a 
representative of the lawyer; (2) between the lawyer and a representative of the 
lawyer; (3) by the client or a representative of the client or the client’s lawyer or a 
representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing 
another party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest therein; 
(4) between representatives of the client or between the client and a representative of 
the client; or (5) among lawyers and their representatives representing the same client. 
 
(c) Who may claim privilege.  The privilege under this rule may be claimed by the 
client, the client’s guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased 
client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association, 
or other organization, whether or not in existence.  A person who was the lawyer or 
the lawyer’s representative at the time of the communication is presumed to have 
authority to claim the privilege, but only on behalf of the client. 
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Uniform Rules of Evidence, the client’s voluntary testimony is not a broad waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege and, instead, generally waives the privilege only when it 
discloses the substance of the privilege communications.163  This would, among 
other things, allow Ohio courts to tap into the substantial reservoir of decisions from 
other jurisdictions interpreting Rules 502 and 510.     
An alternative solution would be to repeal Ohio Revised Code § 2317.02(A) and 
leave the attorney-client privilege solely to “principles of the common law.”  This is 
the approach Congress took with Federal Rule of Evidence 501.164  Adopting a 
                                                          
 
(d) Exceptions.  There is no privilege under this rule: (1) if the services of the lawyer 
were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the 
client knew or reasonably should have known was a crime or fraud; (2) as to a 
communication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same 
deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession 
or by transaction inter vivos; (3) as to a communication relevant to an issue of breach 
of duty by a lawyer to the client or by a client to the lawyer; (4) as to a communication 
necessary for a lawyer to defend in a legal proceeding an accusation that the lawyer 
assisted the client in criminal or fraudulent conduct; (5) as to a communication 
relevant to an issue concerning an attested document to which the lawyer is an 
attesting witness; (6) as to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest 
between or among two or more clients if the communication was made by any of them 
to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action between or 
among any of the clients; or (7) as to a communication between a public officer or 
agency and its lawyers unless the communication concerns a pending investigation, 
claim, or action and the court determines that disclosure will seriously impair the 
ability of the public officer or agency to act upon the claim or conduct a pending 
investigation, litigation, or proceeding in the public interest. 
UNIF. R. EVID. 502 (1999).  Rule 510 provides for waiver of privilege:  
(a) Voluntary disclosure.  A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against 
disclosure waives the privilege if the person or the person’s predecessor, while holder 
of the privilege, voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part 
of the privileged matter.  This rule does not apply if the disclosure itself is privileged. 
 
(b) Involuntary disclosure.  A claim of privilege is not waived by a disclosure that was 
compelled erroneously or made without an opportunity to claim the privilege. 
UNIF. R. EVID. 510 (1999). 
 
163
 See UNIF. R. EVID. 510(a).   
 
164
 FED. R. EVID. 501 provides in relevant part:  
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by 
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory 
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political 
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they 
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and 
experience.   
  And, even in federal courts applying federal common law, the attorney-client privilege 
is no longer exclusively a matter of common law since the September 2008 effective date of 
FED. R. EVID. 502, which addresses some aspects of the attorney-client privilege.  Under OHIO 
R. EVID. 501, the common law applies when a statute does not: “The privilege of a witness, 
person, state or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by statute enacted by the 
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privilege rule similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 501 should not be a radical 
change, as Ohio courts have already developed a substantial body of case law setting 
forth rules governing the attorney-client privilege in situations not expressly 
governed by the statutory privilege.165  Moreover, by switching from the unique 
language of Ohio’s current privilege statute to principles of common law, Ohio 
courts would be able to take advantage of other courts’ guidance on these issues 
without being limited by the language in Ohio Revised Code § 2317.02(A). 
A third option would be to modify the language of Ohio Revised Code 
§ 2317.02(A) to clearly provide that voluntary testimony waives the attorney-client 
privilege only in situations where the testimony reveals the content of the privileged 
communication.  New Mexico and Kansas previously had attorney-client privilege 
statutes that, in the respects relevant here, were similar to Ohio Revised Code 
§ 2317.02(A), but with important differences.166  Specifically, those states’ statutes 
made it reasonably clear that the privilege was waived only when the client’s 
testimony referred to the substance of attorney-client communications.  The New 
Mexico attorney-client privilege statute provided that, “[i]f a person offers himself as 
a witness and voluntarily testifies with reference to the communications specified in 
this section, that is a consent to the examination of the person to whom the 
communications were made as above provided.”167  The Kansas statute, in turn, 
provided that, “if a person without objection on his part testifies concerning any such 
communication, the attorney . . . communicated with may also be required to testify 
on the same subject as though consent had been given.”168  Along the lines of New 
Mexico’s and Kansas’s now-superseded statutes, Ohio Revised Code 
§ 2317.02(A)(1) could be revised to read: “[I]f the client voluntarily testifies reveals 
                                                          
General Assembly or by principles of common law as interpreted by the courts of this state in 
the light of reason and experience.”  Id. 
 
165
 Ohio’s common law governing the attorney-client privilege is probably more in line 
with how the average practitioner thinks the privilege operates than the statutory privilege.  
For example, the common law privilege recognizes that it can be waived by placing privileged 
communications in issue or by disclosing their contents to third parties.  See, e.g., Grace v. 
Mastruserio, 912 N.E.2d 608, 614-15 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (holding that, in situations not 
governed by OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02(A), the test set forth in Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 
(E.D. Wash. 1975), should be used to determine if a party’s actions impliedly waived the 
attorney-client privilege); State v. Post, 513 N.E.2d 754, 761 (Ohio 1987) (holding that a 
client’s disclosure of privileged communications between him and an agent of his attorney to 
a third party waive the privilege).  In contrast, the statutory privilege appears to protect 
communications in situations where a practitioner might think there is no protection, such as 
when the client has repeatedly disclosed the content of the communications to third parties, 
and to not protect communications in situations where a practitioner would likely think the 
communications are protected, such as when a party voluntarily testifies without disclosing 




 In 1993, New Mexico adopted a new attorney-client privilege statute modeled on 
Uniform Rule of Evidence 502.  See N.M. R. EVID. 11-503.  In 1963, Kansas substantially 
revised its privilege statute and removed any reference to waiver based on voluntary 
testimony.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426 (West 2011). 
 
167
 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-6(D) (1953) (emphasis added). 
 
168
 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2805 (1949) (emphasis added). 
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the substance of attorney-client communications in a non-privileged context . . . , the 
attorney may be compelled to testify on the same subject.”169   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The question of whether Ohio should retain the waiver through voluntary 
testimony rule―assuming that is the current rule―is neither close nor difficult.  The 
relevant statute dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century when Ohio 
enacted its first code of civil procedure, and if it in fact leads to a waiver, has been 
substantively unchanged in the intervening one hundred fifty plus years.  The rule 
undermines the policies the attorney-client privilege was designed to further, and the 
policy on which the rule apparently was based―preventing perjured testimony―no 
longer has the primacy it did in the mid-nineteenth century and, in any event, is 
addressed in several other ways.  Ohio’s General Assembly would be well advised, 
as described in the prior section, to repeal or revise Ohio Revised Code 
§ 2317.02(A)(1) so as to clearly disavow a rule that the mere act of a client giving 
voluntary testimony waives the attorney-client privilege. 
 
                                                          
 
169
 A related, but distinct issue that is beyond the scope of this article is whether testimony 
that places otherwise privileged communications at issue waives the privilege or falls within 
an exception.  See, e.g., Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 937 
N.E.2d 533 (Ohio 2010) (addressing attorney self protection exception to the privilege).   
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